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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES. RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Statutes: 
UCA §57-1-38 
57-1-38. Release of security interest. 
(1) As used in this section 
(a) "Secured lender" means: 
(i) a mortgagee on a mortgage; 
(ii) a beneficiary on a trust deed; 
(iii) a person that holds or retains legal title to real property as security for financing the 
purchase of the real property under a real estate sales contract; and 
(iv) any other person that holds or retains a security interest in real property to secure the 
repayment of a secured loan. 
(b) (i) "Secured loan" means a loan or extension of credit, the repayment of which is secured 
by a mortgage, a trust deed, the holding or retention of legal title under a real estate sales 
contract or other security interest in real property, whether or not the security interest is 
perfected. 
(ii) A judgment award secured by a judgment lien is not of itself a secured loan. A 
subsequent written agreement between a judgment creditor and a judgment debtor 
concerning payment of the judgment is a secured loan if it otherwise qualifies under the 
definition in Subsection (l)(b)(i). 
(c) "Security interest" means an interest in real property that secures payment or 
performance of an obligation. Security interest includes a lien or encumbrance. 
(d) "Servicer" means a person that services and receives loan payments on behalf of a 
secured lender with respect to a secured loan. 
(2) This section may not be interpreted to validate, invalidate, alter, or otherwise affect the 
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foreclosure of a mortgage, the exercise of a trustee's power of sale, the exercise of a seller's 
right of reentry under a real estate sales contract, or the exercise of any other power or 
remedy of a secured lender to enforce the repayment of a secured loan. 
(3) A secured lender or servicer who fails to release the security interest on a secured loan 
within 90 days after receipt of the final payment of the loan is liable to another secured 
lender on the real property or the owner or titleholder of the real property for: 
(a) the greater of $1,000 or treble actual damages incurred because of the failure to release 
the security interest, including alt expenses incurred in completing a quiet title action; and 
(b) reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs. 
(4) A secured lender or servicer is not liable under Subsection (3) if the secured lender or 
servicer: 
(a) has established a reasonable procedure to release the security interest on a secured loan 
in a timely manner after the final payment on the loan; 
(b) has complied with this procedure in good faith; and 
(c) is unable to release the security interest within 90 days after receipt of the final payment 
because of the action or inaction of an agency or other person beyond its direct control. 
RULES: 
URCP Bule 12(b)(6): 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether 
a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive 
pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the 
pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of 
jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency 
of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure 
to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before 
pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined 
with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further 
pleading after the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief 
to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may 
assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the 
defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, 
and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to 
such a motion by Rule 56. 
URCP Rule 56. Summary Judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to 
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obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse 
party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all 
or any part thereof 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted 
or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without supporting 
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be filed and 
served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories^ and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may 
be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of 
damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rale judgment is not rendered 
upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing 
of the motion> by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating 
counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy 
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an 
order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to 
which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further 
proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly, 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits 
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such fects as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters 
stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of aH papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit 
shall ber attached thereto or served therewith: The court may permit affidavits to be 
supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When 
a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this role, an adverse party 
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading but his response, by affidavits 
or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for tm£ if he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate^ shall be entered 
against him. 
(f) When affidavits aarer unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the 
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his 
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to 
permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make 
such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of die court ^ t any time that 
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any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the 
purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other 
party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to 
incur, including reasonable attorneys fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged 
guilty of contempt. 
UCJA Rule 4-501. Motions, 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda and documents with 
the court. 
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on dispositive motions. 
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all trial courts of record except proceedings before 
the court commissioners and small claims cases. This rule does not apply to petitions for habeas 
corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda. 
(A) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters, 
shall be accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities appropriate affidavits, and 
copies of or citations by page number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other 
documents relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or opposing a motion 
shall not exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the "statement of material facts" as provided 
in paragraph (2), except as waived by order of the court on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte 
application is made to file an over-length memorandum, the application shall state the length 
of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is in excess often pages, the application 
shall include a summary of the memorandum, not to exceed five pages. 
(B) Memorandum in opposition ta motion. The responding party shall file and serve upon all 
parties within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, 
and all supporting documentation. If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in 
opposition to the motion within ten days after service of the motion, the moving party may 
notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for decision as provided in paragraph (1)((D) 
of this rule. 
(C) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply memorandum within five 
days after service of the responding party's memorandum. 
(D) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day period to file a reply 
memorandum, either party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for decision. 
The notification shall be in the form of a separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to 
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Submit for Decision." The Notice to Submit for Decision shall state the date on which the 
motion was served, the date the memorandum in opposition, if any, was served, the date the 
reply memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing has been requested. The 
notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all parties. If neither party files a notice, the 
motion will not be submitted for decision. 
(2) Motions for summary judgment. 
(A) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authorities m support of a motion for 
summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a concise statement of material facts 
as to which movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate 
numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the 
movant relies. 
(B) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in opposition to a 
motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a verbatim restatement 
of each of the movant's statement of facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists 
followed by a concise statement of material facts which support the party's contention,. Each 
disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those 
portions of the record upon which the opposing party relies. All material facts set forth in the 
movant's statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be 
deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the 
opposing party's statement. 
(3) Hearings. 
(A) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless ordered by the court, or 
requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs (3)(B) or (4) below. 
(B) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action or any claim in the 
action on the merits with prejudice, either party at the time of filing the principal memorandum 
in support of or in opposition to a motion may file a written request for a hearing. 
(C) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the motion or opposition to the 
motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue or set of issues governing the granting or 
denial of the motion has been authoritatively decided. 
(D) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the requesting party. When a 
request for hearing is granted, the court shall set the matter for hearing or notify the requesting 
party that the matter shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for 
hearing and notify all parties of the date and time. 
(E) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the motion, memorandum of 
points and authorities and all documents supporting or opposing the motion shall be delivered 
to the judge hearing the matter at least two working days before the date set for hearing. Copies 
shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time of the hearing. 
Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the court. 
(F) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties file their principal 
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memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed waived. 
(G) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days before the scheduled trial 
date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after that date without leave of the court. 
(H) If a hearing has been requested and the non-moving party fails to file a memorandum in 
opposition, the moving party may withdraw the request or the court on its own motion may 
strike the request and decide the motion without oral argument. 
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause shown, the court may 
grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case where time is of the essence and 
compliance with the provisions of this rule would be impracticable or where the motion does 
not raise significant legal issues and could be resolved summarily. 
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's request may direct 
arguments of any motion by telephone conference without court appearance. A verbatim record 
shall be made of all telephone arguments and the rulings thereon if requested by counsel. 
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VIII 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE ERROR 
WHEN IT GRANTED THE APPELLEES' RULE 12(B)(6) MOTION. THE TRIAL 
COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE WHEN IT GRANTED 
THE APPELLEES' MOTION TO DISQUALIFY MR. SCHULTZ AS COUNSEL 
FOR MS. PETT, AND THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND 
REVERSIBLE WHEN IT FAILED TO GRANT MS. PETT'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
THE APPELLEES' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MS. PETT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED ASA MATTER OF LAW IN GRANTING THE 
APPELLEES' RULE 12(b)(6) MOTION. 
A. THERE WERE NO UNDISPUTED FACTS ON WHICH THE TRIAL COURT 
COULD RELY IN GRANTING THE APPELLEES' MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER 
RULE 12(b)(6) URCP OR IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
THE APPELLEES. 
The appellees' claim that their improper and impermissible assertions of alleged 
facts, contained in their memorandum in support of their Rule 12(bX6) motion to dismiss, 
constitute undisputed facts under the provisions of Rule 4-501(2XB)of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration i^yet another deliberate misrepresentation of the facts and the law 
to this Court. Rule 4-501(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration specifies as 
follows: 
Rule 4-501. Motions. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda 
and documents with the court. 
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on 
dispositive motions. 
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions. 
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Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all trial courts of record except 
proceedings before the court commissioners and small claims cases. This rule 
does not apply to petitions for habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinary 
relief 
Statement of the Rule: 
(2) Motions for summary judgment. 
(A) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authorities in 
support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that 
contains a concise statement of material facts as to which movant contends no 
genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate numbered sentences 
and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the 
movant relies. 
(B) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that 
contains a verbatim restatement of each of the movant's statement of facts as 
to which the party contends a genuine issue exists followed by a concise 
statement of material facts which support the party's contention.. Each 
disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall 
specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the opposing 
party relies. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly 
supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for 
the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the 
opposing party's statement (Emphasis added.) 
Rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration does not apply to 
motions to dismiss made under Rule 12(b)(6) URCP. Likewise, Rule 4-501(2)(B) of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration does not apply to motions made under Rule 12(bX6) 
that were converted into a motion for summary judgment because the trial court improperly 
considered matters outside the pleadings when rendering its decision on a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion. 
A party is under no obligation to dispute assertions of material fact made in a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion. A party filing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not even permitted to make factual 
assertions. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion must be based solely on a plaintiffs complaint, a 
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defendant's counterclaim or a third party's complaint. On a motion made under Rule 
12(b)(6) URCP, the court looks only to material allegations of complaint and not to extrinsic 
documents. £ge, Wright v. University of Utah 876 P.2d 380 (Utah App 1994.) Utah 
mandates that when ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) URCP, only the 
matters pleaded in the complaint may be considered. See Olson v. Park- Craig-Olson. Inc., 
815 P.2d 1356, 1360 (Utah App. 1991), declaring that "under Rule 12(b)(6), court looks at 
facts as pleaded to determine if party is entitled to relief " see also. Colman v. State Land 
Bd.. 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990), declaring that under Rule 12(b)(6) a court looks only to 
material allegations of complaint. 
Because die appellees did not file a motion for summary judgment, (Record at 
page(s) 53-54) Ms. Pert was under no obligation to dispute line by line or paragraph by 
paragraph, the appellees' improper and impermissible assertions of fact contained in the 
appellees' memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss. Ms. Pett had no way of 
knowing in advance that the trial court would improperly consider the perjured affidavit 
submitted by the appellees when the trial court ruled on and granted the appellees' motion to 
dismiss. Therefore, Ms. Pett was not required to file a memorandum in opposition to a 
motion for summary judgment that had not been filed, and her memorandum in opposition 
to the appellees' motion to dismiss cannot be reviewed under a summary judgment standard 
when no motion for summary judgment was ever filed. 
Because the appellees did not file a motion for summary judgment, the improper and 
impermissible assertions of fact based on the perjured affidavit submitted by the appellees 
are not deemed admitted under Rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. The appellees' assertions to this Court that their improper and 
impermissible assertions of fact based on the perjured affidavit submitted by the appellees 
are deemed admitted under Rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration is 
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a deliberate misrepresentation of the facts of this case and the applicable law. 
The trial court had no undisputed facts upon which it could grant summary judgment 
in favor of the appellees, even assuming the trial court granted summary judgments rather 
than granting the appellees' motion to dismiss, which it did not do. Under clear and 
controlling Utah law, the trial court's grant of the appellees' motion to dismiss was improper 
and reversible error. Therefore, the trial court's order granting the appellees' motion to 
dismiss under must be reversed as a matter of law. 
B. MS. PETT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO DISPUTE ANY ASSERTIONS OF 
ALLEGED FACTS IMPROPERLY AND IMPERMISSIBLY ALLEGED IN THE 
APPELLEES' MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE THE APPELLEES FILED A 
MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 12(b)(6) URCP NOT A MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
As previously set forth in this brief, Ms. Pett was not required to dispute the factual 
allegations of the appellees set forth in their memorandum in support of their motion to 
dismiss. See Wright v. University of Utah: Olson v. Park- Craig-Olson- Inc.; Colman v 
State Land Bd.. supra. Therefore, because the appellees filed a motion to dismiss rather 
than a motion for summary judgment, Ms. Pett was not required to dispute the improper and 
impermissible assertions of fact alleged in the appellees' memorandum in support of their 
motion to dismiss. 
Contrary to the appellees' spurious and disingenuous assertions, Ms. Pett is not 
raising for the first time on appeal her claim that the "do-it-your-self reconveyance kit" was 
never sent to her. The appellees' own documents prove beyond any doubt that the "do-it-
your-self reconveyance kit" was never sent to her. Ms. Pett is simply asserting that no 
competent unbiased finder of fact could conclude that the appellees sent her the "do-it-your-
self reconveyance kit", when, as the appellees admit, the "do-it-your-self reconveyance kit" 
was sent to Ms. Pett's brother, whom the appellees do not dispute was not an owner of the 
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property, either at the time the mortgage was paid in full or at the time the appellees falsely 
claim they sent the "do-it-your-self reconveyance kit" to Ms. Pett. (Appellees' brief, page 
19,1[2.) 
Ms. Pett is asserting that the trial court's finding of fact to wit: "Lundberg sent these 
documents to Plaintiff via UPS on January 8, 2002, " is factually incorrect based on the 
appellees' own documents. £fi£ the March 3, 2003 memorandum decision of the trial court 
page 8, paragraph 2 wherein the trial court states: "Lundberg sent these documents to 
Plaintiff via UPS on January 8, 2002, " (Emphasis added.) (Record at page(s) 275) The 
appellees' own documents prove no documents of any nature whatsoever were sent to Ms. 
Pett on January 8, 2002. (Record at page(s) 61-65) 
Likewise Ms. Pettis asserting that the trial court's finding of fact to wit: ((The 
documents were delivered to Plaintiff's porch on January 9, 2002. These documents were 
sent to Plaintiff 5Q days after receiving payment in full " Again, the appellees own 
documents prove that no documents of any nature whatsoever were sent to Ms. Pett on 
January 8, 2002 or delivered to her on January 9, 2002. (Record at page(s) 61-65) As a 
factual matter, no documents could have been delivered to Ms. Pett on January 9, 2002, 
because na documents were ever sent to her. 
The appellees' false and spurious assertion that Ms. Pett is disputing factual 
assertions for the first time on appeal is nothing more than a pathetic attempt to distract this 
Court from the real issuer on appeal, i.e., that: (1) the appellees filed a motion to dismiss 
under the provisions of Rule 12(b)(6) URCP; (2) that the trial court granted the appellees' 
motion do dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6) URCP, and improperly; and (3) that the trial court 
unlawfully made factual findings in conjunction with the appellees' motion to dismiss under 
Rule 12(b)(6). 
-5-
In pertinent part, Rule 12(b) URCP provides as follows: 
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the 
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the 
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court the motion shall be 
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, 
and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material 
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
Neither Rule 12 URCP nor any case interpreting Rule 12 URCP declares, suggest or even 
implies that factual allegations improperly made in a memorandum in support of a motion to 
dismiss are deemed admitted if the motion to dismiss is converted unto a motion for 
summary judgment by the court considering matters outside the pleading. Furthermore, 
Rule 12(b) specifically mandates that if a court is going to treat a motion to dismiss as a 
motion for summary judgment "all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present 
all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." (Emphasis added.) 
In the instant matter, Ms. Pert was not given any opportunity to present any material 
to dispute a motion for summary judgment because she had no idea until the trial court 
rendered its memorandum decision that the trial court was improperly and unlawfully 
considering matters outside Ms. Pett's complaint when ruling on the appellees' motion to 
dismiss. Therefore, Ms. Pert did not have the opportunity to present any material in 
opposition to a summary judgment motion. 
Ms. Pett was under no obligation to dispute the improper and impermissible 
assertions of fact alleged by the appellees in conjunction with their motion to dismiss. The 
trial court improperly and unlawfully made factual findings in conjunction with the 
appellees motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Ms. Pett did not have the opportunity to 
present any material in opposition to a summary judgment motion, because she had no 
notice that the trial court was improperly and unlawfully considering matters outside Ms. 
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Petfs complaint when ruling on the appellees' motion to dismiss. Therefore, the trial 
court's grant of the appellees' motion to dismiss must be reversed as a matter of law. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE NOT APPLICATIONS OF 
LAW TO UNDISPUTED FACTS, AS THE APPELLEES FALSELY AND 
DISINGENUOUSLY CLAIM. 
The appellees falsely and disingenuously claim that the trial courts findings of facts 
to wit: 
(1) "When the facts of this case are applied to the Utah Code Annotated 57-1-38(4) it 
is seen that a reasonable procedure was established to release the security interest in 
a timely manner;" 
(2) u the procedure was followed in good faith; " 
(3) "the reconveyance of the subject deed beyond 90 days was not the fault of the 
Defendant; and" 
(4) "the documents were sent and after that were in the control of the Plaintiff" 
(record at page(s) 275), are applications of law to facts, rather than factual findings by the 
trial court. That assertion is just another deliberation of the facts and in law, in the never-
ending stream of deliberate and disingenuous misrepresentations of fact and law by the 
appellees in this case. 
Reasonableness and good faith are always a factual conclusions. See Wardley Better 
Homes and Garden v. Cannon. 21 P.3d 235, 415 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2001 UT App 48, Utah 
App., Feb 15, 2001 citing Jeschke v. Willis. 811 P.2d 202, 204 (Utah Ct App. 1991). "To 
clarify the matter: As to whether the party lacked good faith, the trial court must make a 
factual finding of a party's subjective intent;" see also. Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 973 
P.2d 932 (Utah, 1998) reiterating the holding of Wardley Better Homes and Garden and 
Jeschke v. Willis. And see Jeffs v. Stubbs. 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah, 1998), wherein the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that the trial court was required to make factual findings as to 
whether members of religious movement who had deeded tracts of land to trust controlled 
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by movement, but had continued to live on land, had good faith belief that they held life 
estate in lands. 
It is, therefore, indisputable that the trial courts findings to wit: "When the facts of 
this case are applied to the Utah Code Annotated 57-1-38(4) it is seen that a reasonable 
procedure was established to release the security interest in a timely manner; " and "the 
procedure was followed in good faith;" are factual findings and not applications of law to 
undisputed facts. The only facts that are undisputed on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6) URCP are the allegations of Ms. Pett set forth in a complaint. See Colman v. State 
Land Bd.. supra. 
The appellees admit that the trial court's findings to wit: "the reconveyance of the 
subject deed beyond 90 days was not the fault of the Defendant; and "the documents were 
sent and after that were in the control of the Plaintiff" are factual findings. (Appellees' 
brief, page 20, % 4. However, the appellees falsely claim that those findings of fact are 
"merely inescapable logical inferences that follow from the undisputed facts." Id. However, 
as previously established in this brief, the only facts that are undisputed on a motion to 
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(bX6) URCP are the allegations of set forth in a complaint. 
The appellees' assertion that Ms. Pett is disputing for the first time on appeal factual 
allegations of the appellees that Ms. Pett was required to dispute at the trial court level is a 
deliberate misrepresentation of the facts and the law to this Court. Ms. Pett simply had no 
duty to dispute any improper and impermissible factual allegations asserted by the appellees 
in their motion to dismiss. Utah law on this point is clear and unequivocal. On a motion to 
dismiss the trial court can only consider the factual allegations contained in the complaint, 
counterclaim or third party complaint, and Rule 4-501(2) does not apply to motions to 
dismiss. Neither Rule 12 URCP nor any case interpreting Rule 12 URCP declares, suggest 
or even implies that factual allegations improperly made in a memorandum in support of a 
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motion to dismiss are deemed admitted if the motion to dismiss is converted into a motion 
for summary judgment by the court considering matters outside the pleading. 
Therefore, none of the appellees' factual allegations made in conjunction with the 
appellees' motion to dismiss are deemed admitted for any purpose whatsoever, and Ms. Pett 
was not required to dispute them. Ms. Pett had no way of knowing in advance that the trial 
court would improperly and unlawfully accept the factual assertions of the appellees 
contained in their memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss as true or that the trial 
court would improperly grant the appellees motion to dismiss based on extrinsic documents 
that are under clear and controlling Utah law specifically excluded on a motion to dismiss. 
Furthermore, the trial court's factual ftndingto wit "When the facts of this case are 
applied to the Utah Code Annotated 57-1-38(4) it is seen that a reasonable procedure was 
established to release the security interest in a timely manner;" cannot be supported by any 
evidence in the record of this case. Nowhere in the appellees' memorandum in support of 
the appellees motion to dismiss do the appellees claim that sending titleholders of real 
property a "do-it-your-self reconveyance kit" is the appellees' normal, regular, usual and/or 
ordinary way of reconveying a security interest in real property to titleholders of the real 
property. The only assertion by the appellees in this case is that when dealing with Ms. Pett, 
the appellees sent Ms. Pett a "do-it-your-self reconveyance kit" rather than simply 
reconveying the appellees security interest in Ms. Pett's property back to her. Therefore, the 
trial court had no evidence from which it could make a factual conclusion that: "[IJt is seen 
that a reasonable procedure was established to release the security interest in a timely 
manner." 
The trial court's factual conclusions that: 
(1) "When the facts of this case are applied to the Utah Code Annotated 57-1-38(4) it 
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is seen that a reasonable procedure was established to release the security interest in 
a timely manner;" 
(2) "the procedure was followed in good faith;" 
(3) "the reconveyance of the subject deed beyond 90 days was not the fault of the 
Defendant; and" 
(4) "the documents were sent and after that were in the control of the Plaintiff," 
(record at page(s) 268), are not based on any evidence in the record of this case. There 
simply is no evidence to marshal to support the trial court's improper and unlawful findings 
of fact, because the appellees have not asserted, claimed or offered any evidence of any 
nature whatsoever that the appellees use the "do-it-yourself reconveyance kit" as a regular 
and routine part of their "business operations" or that the appellees have ever used the "do-
it-yourself reconveyance kit" in conjunction with any reconveyance or release of a security 
interest in real property other than when dealing with Ms. Pett.1 
Because the trial court improperly and unlawfully made findings of fact, which 
cannot be supported by the record, on a motion to dismiss the trial court's memorandum 
decision granting the appellees motion ta dismiss must be reversed as a matter of law. 
D. MS. PETT DID NOT HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISPUTE ANY 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO A MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, AS MANDATED BY RULE 12(b) URCP. 
As previously set forth in this brief, Rule 12(b) URCP mandates that: 
If on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the 
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the 
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be 
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, 
and all 
1. In their "course of proceedings," page 8, footnote 1, the appellees falsely claim that Hansen Land Title Company was the 
trustee of the appellees security interest in Ms. Pett's home. While Hansen Land Title Company was the initial trustee at the 
time Ms. Pett obtained a mortgage with Eagle National Mortgage, the appellees have had five substitutions of trustee filed in 
their false and fraudulent efforts to foreclose on Ms. Pett's home. The appellees assertion that Hansen Land Title Company 
was the trustee for the appellees trust deed on Ms. Pett's home is just another lie by the appellees and their counsel. The 
appellees' counsel was the trustee Bruce Shapiro. Jorgensen and Lundberg were just local counsel for Shapiro's appearance. 
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parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent 
to such a motion by Rule 56. 
In the instant matter, Ms. Pert was not given any opportunity to present any material to 
dispute a motion for summary judgment because she had no idea until the trial court 
rendered its memorandum decision that the trial court was improperly and unlawfully 
considering matters outside Ms. Pett's complaint when ruling on the appellees' motion to 
dismiss. 
Ms. Pett properly and timely filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the appellees' 
motion to dismiss. Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, in effect at that time, that was the only document Ms. Pett was entitled to 
file with respect to the appellees' motion to dismiss. 
The trial court never informed Ms. Pett or her counsel that it was going to consider 
matters outside Ms. Pett's complaint in ruling on the appellees' motion to dismiss. The trial 
court never gave Ms. Pett the opportunity to file any documents of any nature whatsoever 
with respect to a motion for summary judgment. Therefore, Ms. Pett did not have the 
opportunity to present any material in opposition to a summary judgment motion. The trial 
court simply granted the appellees' motion to dismiss without applying any legal standard 
whatsoever. 
Because Ms. Pett was under no obligation to dispute the improper and impermissible 
assertions of fact alleged by the appellees in conjunction with their motion to dismiss, 
because the trial court improperly and unlawfully made factual findings in conjunction with 
the appellees motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), because Ms. Pett did not have the 
opportunity to present any material in opposition to a summary judgment motion, the trial 
committed prejudicial and reversible error when it granted the appellees' motion to dismiss. 
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Therefore, the trial court's grant of the appellees' motion to dismiss must be reversed as a 
matter of law. 
E. EVEN ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE APPELLEES' STATEMENT OF 
FACTS TO BE TRUE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
GRANTING THE APPELLEES' MOTION TO DISMISS. 
Even if this Court were to assume that everything the appellees stated in their motion 
to dismiss is true and even if this Court were to assume that the allegations of fact set forth 
in the appellees9 memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss were deemed admitted, 
the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting the appellees' motion to dismiss under a 
Rule 12(b)(6) URCP standard or under a Rule 56 URCP standard. 
Utah Code §57-1-38 specifies as follows: 
(3) A secured lender or servicer who fails to release the security interest on a 
secured loan within 90 days after receipt of the final payment of the loan is 
liable to another secured lender on the real property or the owner or 
titleholder of the real property for: 
(a) the greater of $1,000 or treble actual damages incurred because of the failure to 
release the security interest, including alt expenses incurred in completing a quiet 
title action; and 
(b) reasonable attorneys'fees and court costs. 
(4) A secured lender or servicer is not liable under Subsection (3) if the 
secured lender or servicer: 
(a) has established a reasonable procedure to release the security interest on a 
secured loan in a timely manner after the final payment on the loan;(b) has complied 
with this procedure in good faith; and 
(c) is unable to release the security interest within 90 days after receipt of the 
final payment because of the action or inaction of an agency or other person 
beyond its direct control. (Emphasis added.) 
Utah Code §57-1-38 requires a secured lender or servicer to "release" the security interest 
on a secured loan within 90 days of the receipt of the final payment. Utah Code §57-1-38 
does not state that a secured lender may simply send documents to a titleholder and tell the 
titleholder to go get the security interest released at the titleholder's own expense. 
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When interpreting a statute, we generally assume each term of the statute 
should, if possible, be given an interpretation that is in accord with the 
commonly accepted meanings of its words. 
Hector. Inc. v. United Sav. and Loan Ass'n. 741 P.2d 542 (Utah, 1987), citing Board of 
Education v. Salt Lake County. 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983) and Grant v. Utah State 
Land Board. 26 Utah 2d 100, 485 P.2d 1035 (1971). Black's Law Dictionary defines 
release as follows: 
The relinquishment, concession or giving up of a right, claim or privilege, by 
the person in whom it exists or to whom it accrues, to the person against 
whom it might have been demanded or enforced. " 
Black's Law Dictionary further defines "release of mortgage" as follows: 
A written document which discharges the obligation of a mortgage upon 
payment and which is given by the mortgagee to mortgagor or holder of equity 
and recorded in the office where deeds and other instruments of conveyance 
are recorded. 
Utah courts have long held that the word "release," when used in connection with an 
interest in real estate, is a word of conveyance and intended to pass title. §££ Ruthrauff v. 
Silver King Western Min. & Mill. Co.. 80 P.2d 338 (Utah 1938), declaring: 
The operative words therein, "remise, release and quitclaim, " have often been 
judicially defined and applied. They are words of conveyance and are effective 
to pass the grantor's title, if any, to the grantee. They are not mere words of 
release, whatever may be the meaning of "release " when employed alone. 
In Hector, Inc. v. United Sav. and Loan Assfn. supra., the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Mortgage release statute and trust deed reconveyance statute are in pari 
materia; they serve exact same purpose of protecting borrowers who secure 
their debt by interest in real estate from lenders who refuse to return security 
when debt is discharged; statutes hold lenders to a high degree of care and 
promptness in clearing title to a borrower's property when debt is paid since 
lender no longer has legitimate interest in security and borrower has great 
interest in freeing property of security interest. 
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Clearly, the intended meaning of "release" in Utah Code §57-1-38 is its normal and 
usual meaning and the same as stated in Ruthrauff v. Silver King Western Min. & Mill. Co.r 
it is a word of conveyance. It means a written document which discharges the obligation of 
a mortgage upon payment. It does not mean simply sending a "do-it-your-self reconveyance 
kit" to a titieholder. Simply sending a "do-it-your-self reconveyance kit" to a titleholder 
does not convey title and it is not a relinquishment, concession or giving up of a right, claim 
or privilege, by the person in whom it exists or to whom it accrues, to the person against 
whom it might have been demanded or enforced. Simply sending a "do-it-your-self 
reconveyance kit" to a titleholder is not a reasonable procedure to reconvey or release a 
security interest to the titleholder, especially when most titleholders are not familiar with 
reale state procedures or real estate law. And in this case, where the "do-it-your-self 
reconveyance kit" was not even sent to Ms. Pett, there can be no question that the appellees' 
sending Ms. Pett's brother a do-it-yourself reconveyance kits does not comply with the 
provisions of Utah Code §57-1-38. 
In South Sanpitch Co. v. Pack. 765 P.2d 1279 (Utah App. 1988) this Court held: 
While a trustee's reconveyance is not referred to explicitly in § 57-1-1, a 
reconveyance serves to release a security interest in property and therefore to 
"alien," i.e., alienate, that interest. See Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 53 (1986). 
And, in Tretheway v. FurstenaiL 40 P.3d 649 (Utah App. 2001), this Court specifically held 
that Utah Code Ann. § 57-1- 33. l(l)(a) requires a reconveyance of trust property when an 
obligation secured by a trust deed is satisfied. In Tretheway v. FurstenaiL this court 
declared: 
A partial release of the Trust Property is not sufficient. This interpretation 
comports with Utah Code Ann. § 57-1- 33. l(l)(a) (Supp. 1999), which requires 
the trustee of a trust deed to reconvey trust property to the beneficiary 
"fwjhen an obligation secured by a trust deed has been satisfied." 
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The law in Utah with respect to the obligation to reconvey a trust deed upon final payment 
has been recognized by Utah courts for nearly sixty-five years. In Chapman v. Schiller, 83 
P.2d 249 (Utah 1938), the Utah Supreme Court declared: "A trustee under the ordinary 
deed of trust has authority only to foreclose the mortgage or cancel or reconvey the 
mortgaged or trust property upon payment. There is no right under Utah law to simply send 
a titleholder a "do-it-your-self reconveyance kit" rather than reconveying a security interest 
as required under Utah law. 
Utah Code §57-1-38 requires a secured lender or servicer to release the security 
interest on a secured loan within 90 days after receipt of the final payment of the loan, not 
just send the titleholder documents and tell the titleholder to go obtain a release at the 
titleholder's own expense. Under clear and controlling Utah law, a secured lender or 
servicer is required to release the security interest on a secured loan within 90 days after 
receipt of the final payment of the loan, not just send the titleholder documents and tell the 
titleholder to go obtain a release at the titleholder's own expense. Therefore, the appellees' 
sending a "do-it-your-self reconveyance kit" to Ms. Pett's brother, who was not even a title 
holder on Ms. Pett's property, and telling Ms. Pett's brother to go have the trust deed 
released at his own expense does not comply with the requirements of Utah Code §57-1-38. 
Furthermore, the appellees have not established or claimed that they use the "do-it-your-self 
reconveyance kit" for reconveyance of all trust deeds or any trust deeds other than when 
dealing with Ms. Pert. 
The appellees have only claimed that in this particular situation, with Ms. Pert, that 
the appellees allegedly used the "do-it-your-self reconveyance kit" to "release" their security 
interest in Ms. Pett's property. The appellees and their counsel simply sent the "do-it-your-
self reconveyance kit" and addressed envelope containing the "do-it-your-self reconveyance 
kit" to Ms. Pett's brother rather than Ms. Pett as the appellees final action to harass, vex, 
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annoy, and increase Ms. Pett's cost of litigation with the appellees. The appellees and their 
counsel sent the "do-it-your-self reconveyance kit" and addressed envelope containing the 
"do-it-your-self reconveyance kit" to Ms. Pett's brother rather than Ms. Pett out of spite and 
vindictiveness for ten years of litigation with Ms. Pett. The appellees normal and regular 
procedure for releasing a security interest in a titleholder's real property is not to send a "do-
it-your-self reconveyance kit." Therefore, the appellees sending a "do-it-your-self 
reconveyance kit" to Ms. Pett's brother did not comply with the appellees obligation to 
release or reconvey their security interest in Ms. Pett's property to her. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN GRANTING THE 
APPELLEES' MOTION TO DISQUALIFY MR. SCHULTZ AS COUNSEL FOR MS. 
PETT. 
The facts of this case are in no way similar to the facts of Watkiss & Cambell v Foa 
&Son. 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991). In Watkiss the opposition did not file a perjurious 
affidavit to which only the counsel for Foa could reply and contradict the perjurious 
assertions submitted by the opposing party. In Watkiss. the counsel for Foa was not 
required to choose between allowing perjured statements being accepted as fact or filing an 
affidavit controverting perjurious statements. In Watkiss. L. Charles Spafford, the counsel 
for Foa, voluntarily presented his own personal counter-affidavit, stating that he was 
familiar with the billing practices in the region and that after reviewing the record in the 
case, he was of the opinion that Watkiss's bill was excessive. As the Utah Supreme Court 
noted in Watkiss. any attorney could have submitted the affidavit voluntarily filed by 
Spafford in opposition to Watkiss' motion for summary judgment. 
In this case Mr. Schultz only filed an affidavit because he had to do so to controvert 
the perjurious statements of Jorgensen. Jorgensen prepared a perjurious affidavit at the 
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request of the appellees and their counsel. The appellees then suborned Jorgensen's perjury 
by filing Jorgensen's perjurious affidavit with the court. Ms. Pett's counsel, Mr. Schultz, 
had no alternative other than to file an affidavit controverting the perjurious statements of 
Jorgensen or to allow Jorgensen's perjurious statements to be accepted as true. Unlike the 
attorney in Watkiss, no one other than Mr. Schultz could controvert the perjurious affidavit 
of Jorgensen. 
In Watkiss- the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
[WJe deem it to be generally inadvisable for members of the bar to testify in 
litigation where they personally represent a party. The need for the testimony 
of counsel must be compelling and must be necessary to preserve the cause of 
action as set forth in rule 3.7 above. 
Clearly Mr. Schultz's affidavit controverting the perjurious statements of Jorgensen is 
justified under the holding of Watkiss & Cambell v Foa & Son. Undisputedly, Mr. 
Schultz's testimony was needed and necessary to preserve Ms. Pett's cause of action that 
would have been dismissed based on the perjurious assertions of Jorgensen but for Mr. 
Schultz's affidavit. 
In her perjurious affidavit, Jorgensen claims that she had the alleged conversation 
with Mr. Schultz and that during the course of that alleged conversation she entered into an 
oral agreement with Mr. Schultz, whereby it was agreed that the appellees would simply 
send Ms. Pett do-it-yourself reconveyance forms. However, neither Jorgensen nor the 
appellees can speeify when the alleged conversation allegedly took place. Neither Jorgensen 
nor the appellees can specify where the alleged conversation allegedly took place. And, 
neither Jorgensen nor the appellees can produce any evidence that the alleged conversation 
ever took place. 
The appellees and Jorgensen have had ample opportunity to provide evidence that the 
alleged conversation that Jorgensen claims she had with Mr. Schultz ever took place. They 
have not done so because the alleged conversation never took place and the appellees as 
well as Jorgensen know that it never took place. 
Mr. Schultz's phone records for the time period during which the alleged 
conversation took place prove that Mr. Schultz never made any calls to Jorgensen or her 
firm. Neither Jorgensen nor the appellees have produced, or can produce, any phone 
records substantiating Jorgensen's claim that she ever had the alleged phone conversation 
with Mr. Schultz. Neither Jorgensen nor the appellees have done so, and cannot do so, 
because neither Jorgensen nor the appellees knew a phone number where Jorgensen could 
have contacted Mr. Schultz during the time period she claims to have had the conversation 
with Mr. Schultz. 
Neither the appellees nor Jorgensen claim that there was a face-to-face meeting 
between Jorgensen and Mr. Schultz, because neither the appellees nor Jorgensen knew 
where Mr. Schultz was on any given day and, therefore, dared not specify a date or time for 
the alleged conversation because Mr. Schultz may well have been in court, in a deposition, a 
meeting with clients or out of state on any date they falsely claim the conversation took 
place. 
At the time Jorgensen falsely claims that she had the alleged conversation with Mr. 
Schultz Mr. Schultz's office number was a Heber phone number and his voice mail was a 
Provo phone number. Jorgensen's office was in Salt Lake City. Therefore, if the alleged 
conversation occurred as Jorgensen claims^ she would have phone records confirming the 
long distance call to Mr, Schultz and could have produced those phone records. 
Neither the appellees nor Jorgensen have produced or can produce, any 
documentation evidencing or memorializing the alleged conversation. Every other 
-18-
conversation between Mr. Schultz and Jorgensen was memorialized in either a court 
document or an email because Mr. Schultz and Jorgensen did not trust each other. 
Jorgensen's assertion that Mr. Schultz would enter into any type of agreement with 
Jorgensen without memorializing the agreement in writing is just ludicrous. 
Under the holding ofWatkiss, the trial court could not disqualify Mr. Schultz for 
failing an affidavit that only he could file and which was necessary to preserve Ms. Pett's 
cause of action against the appellees. If the trial court was going to grant the defendants' 
motion to disqualify Mr. Schultz based on Jorgensen's perjured claim that she entered into 
an agreement with Mr. Schultz, whereby it was agreed that the defendants would simply 
send Ms. Pett do-it-yourself reconveyance forms, the trial court was to require the appellees 
to provide some modicum of evidence that the alleged conversation ever took place prior to 
concluding that Mr. Schultz was a necessary witness to the substance of the fictitious 
conversation. At the very least, the trial court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing. 
If Mr. Schultz had not disputed that the conversation ever took place but only 
disputed the substance of the conversation, then the frial court would have been correct in 
disqualifying Mr. Schultz as counsel for Ms. Pett. Likewise, if Mr. Schultz had voluntarily 
filed an affidavit rather than being forced to file an affidavit to rebut the perjurious 
assertions of Jorgensen, the trial court would have been correct in disqualifying Mr. Schultz 
as counsel for Ms. Pett. However, when Mr. Schultz only filed an affidavit controverting 
the perjurious statements of Jorgensen, because he had no alternative but to file the affidavit 
or allow Ms. Pett's case be dismissed, it was improper for the trial court to conclude that the 
conversation Jorgensen alleged she had with Mr. Schultz ever took place and preclude Mr. 
Schultz from representing Ms. Pett based oUthe perjurious statements of Jorgensen. At a 
minium, the trial court had to first require the appellees to prove that the alleged 
conversation with Jorgensen ever took place before the trial court could determine that Ms. 
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Schultz was a necessary witness to the alleged conversation. By determining that Mr. 
Schultz was a necessary witness to the alleged conversation, without first determining that 
the alleged conversation ever took place, the trial court ruled, on the basis of Jorgensen's 
perjurious and unsupported affidavit, that the conversation in fact took place as Jorgensen 
alleged and that the only question concerning the alleged conversation was the substance of 
the conservation. 
If the alleged conversation between Mr. Schultz and Jorgensen actually took place, 
the appellees and Jorgensen have the ability to prove that it took place. Neither Mr. Schultz 
nor Ms. Pett can prove a negative, i.e., that the alleged conversation with Jorgensen did not 
take place. However, they can prove that Mr. Schultz never initiated any calls to Jorgensen 
and that Mr. Schultz never personally met with Jorgensen during the time period that the 
appellees and Jorgensen claim that the alleged oral conversation took place. 
Although Mr. Schultz cannot prove that the alleged conversation with Jorgensen ever 
took place, Mr. Schultz is willing to submit to a polygraph examination concerning the 
alleged conversation. If the polygraph results establish that Mr. Schultz is lying about not 
participating in the conversation, alleged by Jorgensen to have occurred, Mr. Schultz will 
personally pay all of the appellees' cost and fees and will submit himself to this court, the 
district court and/or the state bar for whatever disciplinary action is appropriate. 
Ms. Pett invites Jorgensen to likewise submit to a polygraph examination to 
determine if the alleged conversation with Mr. Schultz ever took place. However, Ms. Pett 
knows that Jorgensen will never agree to submit to any such examination, because Jorgensen 
knows she never had any such conversation with Mr. Schultz and she knows that a 
polygraph examination will show that she is laying about that alleged conversation. 
It was prejudicial and reversible error for the trial court to determine, based on 
Jorgensen's perjurious affidavit that the alleged oral conversation between Jorgensen and 
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Mr. Schultz in fact took place. The trial court was required to at the very least conduct an 
evidentiary hearing to determine if the alleged conversation with Jorgensen ever took place 
before disqualifying Mr. Schultz as counsel for Ms. Pert. The trial court abused its discretion 
in determining that the alleged conversation between Jorgensen and Mr. Schultz ever took 
place, without requiring the appellees and Jorgensen to provide any evidence supporting 
Jorgensen's perjurious claim that the alleged conversation took place. Therefore, this Court 
must issue an order reversing the trial court's memorandum decision disqualifying Mr. 
Schultz as counsel for Ms. Pett. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FAILING TO GRANT MS. 
RETT'S MOTION TO STRIKE THE MEMORANDUM OF THE APPELLEES IN 
OPPOSITION TO MS. PETTS MOTIONFOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Although Ms. Pett withdrew her appeal of the trial court's failure to grant her Motion 
to Strike the memorandum of the appellees in opposition to Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the appellees have nonetheless chosen to assert that failure as an issue on appeal 
and argue that issue. Therefore, Ms. Pett will respond to the appellees spurious and 
disingenuous argument. 
Rule 4-501(l)(B) specifies that: "The responding party shall file and serve upon all 
parties within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum in opposition to the 
motion, and all supporting documentation. " (Emphasis added.) The trial court deliberately 
ignored this provision when computing the time period in which the appellees had to 
respond to Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment, and, therefore, improperly denied Ms. 
Pett's Motion to Strike the appellees' memorandum in opposition to Ms. Pett's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
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The trial court applied one standard for timely responses to Ms. Pett in this case and a 
different standard to the appellees. The trial court improperly concluded that the appellees' 
time to respond to Ms. Pett's motion for Summary Judgment ran from the time Ms. Pett filed 
her Motion with the trial court rather than the date on which Ms. Pett served the Motion on 
the appellees. Then, the trial court concluded that the appellee's response to Ms. Pett's 
Motion for Summary Judgment was timely when it was allegedly mailed rather than when it 
was filed. The proper standard for computation of time is just the opposite. 
The time calculation for the appellees to respond to Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary 
Judgment began on the day Ms. Pett mailed the Motion to the appellees, not on the day she 
filed die Motion with the trial court. If calculation of the time to respond to a motion begins 
on the day it is filed with the court, a party's time to respond could expire prior to the time 
the motion was ever served on the party or the party could have only a few days in which to 
respond to the motion rather than the ten days plus mailing time and excluded time provided 
for in the UCJA and the URCP. Calculation of time to respond to a motion based on the 
date a motion is filed with the court is never the appropriate standard for the calculation of 
the time to respond to a motion. 
In this case, the trial court improperly and unlawfully concluded that the date from 
which to calculate the permissible time for the appellees' response to Ms. Pett's Motion for 
Summary Judgment was the date the trial court entered Ms. Pett's Motion on the docket 
sheet rather than the date on which Ms. Pett served the appellees with her Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The trial court concluded that Ms. Pett served her Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the appellees on November 30r 2002 but then calculated the time 
period for the appellees to respond to Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment from 
December 2, 2002, the date the trial court entered Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment 
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on the docket sheet. (Record at page(s) 268) That conclusion was improper and prejudicial 
to Ms. Pett and constitutes reversible error on the part of the trial court. 
The proper calculation for the date on which the appellees memorandum was due is 
ten days from the November 30, 2002. Excluding November 30, as the date Ms. Pett mailed 
her Summary Judgment Motion to the appellees and excluding Sunday, December 1st, 
December 2nd through 6th count as five of the appellees ten days to respond. December 7 
and 8 are excluded, because the ten days for the appellees to respond is less than eleven 
days. December 9 through 13 are then counted as the appellees last five days in which to 
respond. Saturday, December 14 and Sunday, December 15 are included in the three 
additional days for service mail added to the appellees time to respond, because the three 
additional days for service by mail include intervening Saturdays, Sundays and holidays. 
Therefore, December 16, 2002 was the appellees' last day for the appellees to timely and 
properly file any response to Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The trial court admits that the appellees did not file their memorandum in opposition 
to Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment until December 18, 2002, but nonetheless 
improperly and unlawfully concluded that the appellees had until December 18, 2002 to file 
their memorandum in opposition to Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment. Rule 4-501 
UCJA, however, specifies that a response to a motion for summary judgment must be filed 
within ten days, not mailed within ten days. It was, therefore, unlawful and prejudicial for 
the trial court to accept the appellees' memorandum in opposition to Ms. Pett's Motion for 
Summary Judgment as timely and properly filed on December 18, 2002, when Rule 4-501 
UCJA specifies that the memorandum must be filed no later that ten days, not mailed no 
later than ten days 
Because the trial court improperly and unlawfully determined the time period in 
which the appellees could timely file a response to Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary 
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Judgment, the trial court's denial of Ms. Pett's Motion to Strike the memorandum of the 
appellees in opposition to Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment must be reversed, and 
the trial court directed to enter an order striking the appellees' memorandum in opposition to 
Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment. Because Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary 
Judgment will be unopposed after the appellees untimely memorandum in opposition to Ms. 
Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment is stricken, the trial court should also be directed to 
grant Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment as an unopposed motion. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
The trial court erred when it granted the appellees' Rule 12 (b)(6) Motion. The trial 
court improperly and unlawfully considered matters outside of Ms. Pett's complaint when it 
granted the appellees' motion to dismiss. The trial court improperly and unlawfully made 
findings of facts in granting the appellees' motion to dismiss. Even if the trial court had 
decided the appellees' motion to dismiss under the standard for summary judgment specified 
in Rule 56 URCP, the trial court improperly and unlawfully made findings of facts and 
granted the appellees' Rule 12(b)(6) motion based on those improper, inaccurate and 
unlawful findings of fact. Therefore, Ms. Pett is entitled to have this Court issue an order 
reversing the trial courts grant of the appellees' motion to. 
The trial court also committed prejudicial and reversible error when it granted the 
appellees' motion to disqualify Mr. Schultz as counsel for Ms. Pett. The trial court 
improperly determined that Mr. Schultz in fact had a conversation with Jorgensen wherein 
Mr. Schultz agreed that the appellees could simply send a "do-it-yourself reconveyance kit" 
to Ms. Pett so that she could have the appellees' trust deed reconveyed, rather than requiring 
the appellees to reconvey the trust deed to Ms. Pett, as required by Utah law. The appellees 
did not, and cannot, produce any evidence establishing that any conversation between Mr. 
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Schultz and Jorgensen ever took place, as falsely alleged by Jorgensen in her perjurious 
affidavit. The trial court improperly assumed that Jorgensen's perjury was true and 
improperly disqualified Mr. Schultz as counsel for Ms. Pett without requiring any proof that 
the alleged conversation took place. Therefore, Ms. Pett is entitled to have this Court 
reverse the trial court's order disqualifying Mr. Schultz as counsel for Ms. Pett and require 
that the appellees provide proof that the alleged conversation between Mr. Schultz and 
Jorgensen ever occurred. 
The trial court also improperly and incorrectly calculated the time period in which the 
appellees had to file a motion in opposition to Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and improperly and unjustifiably denied Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
WHEREFORE, Ms. Pett respectfully moves this Court for an order reversing the trial 
court's decision granting the appellees' Rule 12 (b)(6) motion, reversing the trial court's 
decision granting the appellees' motion to disqualify Mr. Schultz as counsel for Ms. Pett and 
denying Ms. Pett's Motion to Strike the untimely and improper memorandum of the 
appellees in opposition to Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment. Ms. Pett also requests 
that she be awarded her costs and attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting this appeal. 
- /A 
Respectfully submitted this day of January 2004. 
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney for Sheri Pett 
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